Does inflation targeting matter? - commentary by Frederic S. Mishkin




ecause inflation targeting is a relatively
recent phenomena, in the past we have had
insufficient data to conduct time-series econo-
metric work to evaluate this important new mone-
tary policy strategy. However, now that inflation
targeting has been around for close to ten years,
we are able to do some preliminary econometric
work on this topic. This is exactly what Neumann
and von Hagen do in their paper, and it is a wel-
comed addition to the literature.
I break my comments up into two parts. The
first part looks at the empirical analysis in the paper,
while the second examines the question of whether
the non-inflation-targeting countries that Neumann
and von Hagen look at are really that different from
the inflation targeters they study.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Neumann and von Hagen produce several pieces
of evidence quite favorable to inflation targeting. 
• After countries adopt inflation targeting, the
volatility of inflation, interest rates, and output
falls to levels that are similar to those in the
successful non-inflation-targeting countries
(the United States, Germany, and Switzerland).
• Taylor rules display a greater focus on the
control of inflation after adoption of inflation
targeting.
• Vector autoregression (VAR) evidence indicates
that the relative importance of inflation shocks
as a source of the variance of interest rates
rises after adoption of inflation targeting, and
this might also suggest a greater focus on
inflation control after adoption of inflation
targeting.
• The response of inflation and output to oil
price shocks is relatively more favorable after
inflation targeting is adopted.
Neumann and von Hagen thus conclude that
inflation targeting has improved monetary policy
performance in the countries that have adopted it.
Given that my past research has been quite
favorable to inflation targeting, it is not surprising
that I like the conclusions in this paper. Unfortunately
I am forced to point out that the evidence in the
paper suffers from several problems and so is not
completely convincing.
Although the reduction in volatility after inflation
targeting is adopted is suggestive, there is the poten-
tial problem that possibly it is something else that
produced these declines. Neumann and von Hagen
are aware of this problem, and this is why they turn
to other evidence to evaluate whether inflation target-
ing has been beneficial.
The Taylor rule evidence also looks quite favor-
able to inflation targeting because it suggests that
the central bank puts a greater weight on the control
of inflation relative to output stabilization, thus mak-
ing it more likely that price stability will be achieved.
However, a troubling feature of the Taylor rules esti-
mated in the paper is that, even when the long-run
coefficient on inflation has risen after inflation target-
ing has been adopted, it still remains less than 1.
Values less than 1 on this coefficient indicate that
the inflation process is unstable: When inflation and
inflation expectations rise, the central bank raises
interest rates by a lesser amount so that the real rate
of interest falls. The lower real interest rate then
stimulates inflation further and is thus likely to lead
to an inflationary spiral. Indeed, as John Taylor
(1993) has pointed out, an estimated Taylor rule for
the United States in the pre-1979 period does have
a coefficient less than 1 on inflation, and this is an
explanation why inflation rose to double-digit levels
by the end of the 1970s.
Therefore, although the estimated Taylor rules
in the paper suggest that the weight on the inflation
gap increases after inflation targeting has been
adopted, the central bank is still not doing its job
well enough if the long-run inflation coefficient
remains less than 1, as it does for all inflation-
targeting countries other than Sweden in the monthly
estimates and Sweden and the United Kingdom in
the quarterly estimates. The Taylor rule estimates
do not suggest that inflation-targeting countries
have improved monetary policy enough to achieve
the goal of price stability. The fact that inflation-
targeting countries have been so successful in infla-
tion control should raise some concern about the
Taylor rule estimates.
Furthermore, the Taylor rule estimates for the
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long-run coefficients on inflation that are less
than 1. The exception is Germany in the post-1993
period. Especially troubling is that the long-run
coefficient on inflation is less than 1 for the United
States in both the 1978-92 and 1993-2001 periods.
These results appear to be inconsistent with those
of Taylor (1993) who finds that, for the United States
after 1979, the coefficient on inflation rises above
1—which is an important reason why the perfor-
mance of monetary policy improved so much in
the post-1979 period relative to the pre-1979 period.
The authors point out in an appendix that the
low coefficients on their estimated Taylor rules stem
from using the CPI to measure inflation rather than
the GDP deflator as Taylor does. This is somewhat
troubling because it suggests large differences in
results occur when slightly different inflation mea-
sures are utilized. The most serious problem with
the Taylor rule results in the paper may not be that
monetary policy does not respond sufficiently to
changes in (CPI) inflation, but rather that estimated
Taylor rules in the paper are misspecified. From my
experience with central banks, it is quite clear that
they respond to future forecasts of inflation rather
than to current inflation. Indeed, this is exactly what
theorizing on the design of optimal monetary policy
suggests that they should do. Estimating Taylor rules
with actual rather than forecasted inflation thus
results in an errors-in-variables problem for the
long-run inflation coefficient and is thus likely to
bias this coefficient downward. Orphanides (2001)
shows that this is exactly what occurs in estimates
of Taylor rules for the United States. The fit is better
when one-year-ahead inflation forecasts are used
in the Taylor rule equations and the inflation co-
efficients are much higher and always above 1.
Orphanides (2001) also shows that using revised
data, rather than the data available in real time,
creates a further errors-in-variables problem, as
does possible improper measurement of the output
gap. The bottom line is that, although I am sympa-
thetic to the view that countries adopting inflation
targeting increase their focus on inflation control,
I am highly skeptical of the Taylor rule evidence in
this paper that supports this.
I also am very skeptical of the VAR evidence in
the paper. A basic problem with VARs is that they
appear to yield a lot of useful evidence without
putting a lot of structure in their models. However,
as economists, we always need to be skeptical of
getting something for nothing, because as we always
say, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.” This
applies to econometrics just as much as it does to
filling our stomachs. The paper uses an implicit
identification scheme that inflation and output
react to monetary policy only with a lag. This is a
standard identification scheme, and although not
without its problems, it is not unreasonable. How-
ever, a serious problem for the analysis in this paper
arises from the fact that VARs don’t have any struc-
tural model of dynamics, and such a structural
model is needed if we are to interpret the response
of monetary policy to inflation. The fact that the
contribution of inflation shocks to the variance of
interest rates rises does not tell us that monetary
policy has an increased focus on the control of infla-
tion. To see this, consider the following example.
Suppose that the monetary authorities greatly
increase their focus on inflation control and are
able to develop a super-credible inflation-targeting
regime. This regime would then change the time-
series process of inflation so that, when inflation
rises above its target level, the public and markets
expect it to fall back down to the target level very
quickly. Then the central bank doesn’t need to
respond much to the temporary upward blip in
inflation because inflation expectations will keep
inflation from deviating much from the inflation
target. In this environment, we would expect a
decreased contribution of inflation shocks to the
variance of interest rates. Should the smaller impact
of inflation shocks on interest rates then be inter-
preted as indicating that the central bank is less
focused on inflation? Of course not, because in this
example the opposite has actually occurred. The
above reasoning suggests that the VAR evidence in
the paper tells us little about the impact of inflation
targeting on the conduct of monetary policy.
The most interesting evidence in the paper
involves the examination of the different responses
before and after inflation targeting to upward spikes
in oil prices in 1978 and 1998. Neumann and von
Hagen look at oil price shocks because it is reason-
able to assume that these shocks are exogenous to
most of the countries they are studying. (This might
be less true for the United States in the 1978 episode
because overly expansionary monetary policy might
have driven up oil prices at the time; see Barsky and
Killian, 2001.) It is also useful to look at the effect
of the oil price shock in 1998 on inflation targeting
because one commonly heard claim is that infla-
tion targeting has not been tested because so many
shocks in the 1990s have been favorable. However,
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Hebbel, 2002) that this view is incorrect. To the
contrary, we point out that the oil price shock in
1998 was an adverse shock that was handled very
well by inflation-targeting regimes, which is also
the conclusion that Neumann and von Hagen reach.
Their paper uses the method of double differ-
ences to look at the difference in outcomes for
inflation-targeting countries relative to non-inflation-
targeting countries. To justify their analysis, they
need several assumptions. First is that the response
to other exogenous shocks is the same for both
inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting coun-
tries. Second is that, when the oil price shock occurs,
nothing else is occurring that affects inflation-
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries
differently. Third is that the dynamic response to
oil price shocks is the same in all inflation-targeting
countries. It would be easy to cast some doubt 
on the first two assumptions, but they are pretty
reasonable relative to other assumptions we often
have to make in doing empirical work. However,
there are more serious concerns about the third
assumption that I think the authors of the paper
share. Under the third assumption, double differenc-
ing would choose the same starting date, and this
is what is conventionally done. However, Neumann
and von Hagen instead make use of a nonstandard
dating scheme that chooses the starting date for
each country on the basis of when the trough and
peak of the inflation rate is reached after the oil
price shock. It is appropriate that they choose a date
after the shock because it takes time for commodity
price shocks to affect inflation. However, it is not
clear under what assumption their procedure makes
sense. I think that the reason they chose to use this
procedure is because they have doubts about the
assumption that the dynamic response to oil price
shocks is the same in all the inflation-targeting coun-
tries, and this is a little worrisome. I am not sure
how important this is because it is not clear that
their results would be very different if they chose
the same starting date for the double differencing.
To conclude my discussion of the empirical
work in the paper: Although the research conducted
by Neumann and von Hagen is worth doing, I have
some doubts about the quality of the evidence. Thus
I see the results as suggestive, but not much more
than that. Should the fact that there are doubts
about the evidence in this paper shake our faith in
the benefits of inflation targeting? I think not. The
doubts about the evidence just mean that we have
to look at broader types of evidence. One reason
why some of my recent research on inflation target-
ing (Mishkin and Posen, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999;
and Mishkin and Savastano, 2001) has focused on
historical case studies is because of the difficulty of
doing econometric analysis of the type done in this
paper. (Neumann and von Hagen call their double-
differencing empirical work a case study approach,
but it really is more like an event study rather than
a case study.) Case studies allow us to see how infla-
tion targeting has worked in practice and so provide
some evidence about the mechanisms through
which inflation targeting has affected the interaction
of the markets, the public, politicians, and central
banks. Then we can see if that interaction has been
likely to improve how monetary policy is conducted
and whether it results in better policy outcomes.
This type of evidence is also not without its faults
because it is necessarily anecdotal. However, I think
that we need to be honest and admit that all evidence,
including econometric evidence, has its faults. This
is why we need to take a broader view on what evi-
dence to examine and try to understand what makes
monetary policy strategies successful from alterna-
tive perspectives.
ARE THE SUCCESSFUL NON-INFLATION
TARGETERS VERY DIFFERENT FROM
INFLATION TARGETERS?
I want to address a final issue that is also very
relevant to the interpretation of this paper. It is not
at all clear that the successful non-inflation targeters
that Neumann and von Hagen study (the United
States and especially Germany and Switzerland) are
very different in their monetary policy strategies
from the inflation targeters.
As documented in my work with Ben Bernanke,
Thomas Laubach, and Adam Posen (Bernanke et al.,
1999), the successful non-inflation targeters’ strate-
gies for conducting monetary policy have many of
the same elements as those pursued by inflation
targeters. Indeed, my reading of Neumann and von
Hagen’s paper is that they would agree with the
view that inflation targeters and the successful non-
inflation targeters are not all that different. Both do
focus on the long-run goal of price stability and
stress transparency, accountability, and flexibility,
the key elements of inflation-targeting regimes.
Thus, the adoption of inflation targeting should be
seen as a convergence to best practice in the conduct
of monetary policy. 
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monetary targeting worked well in Germany and
that the evidence does not suggest that inflation
targeting would have been superior to the monetary
targeting approach used by the Bundesbank from
1974 to 1998. As pointed out by Neumann and von
Hagen and also in my work with Bernanke, Laubach,
and Posen, the Bundesbank’s monetary targeting
strategy was a success because it helped both the
officials inside the central bank and the public and
markets to focus on longer-run issues, particularly
price stability. This view leads the authors to end
their paper by stating that, “Given the central bank’s
commitment to price stability and its willingness to
bind its policy to an intermediate target that serves
as the nominal anchor for monetary policy, the
choice between an inflation target or a monetary
aggregate then is probably more a question of cul-
ture than economic principles.” I agree.
However, it is important to point out that the
context (culture) for the conduct of monetary policy
in Germany is quite different from what it is in the
European Monetary Union. Because of its history
in which it experienced horrendous costs from
hyperinflation, the German public is far more sophis-
ticated about monetary policy than other Europeans
and has much greater support for a central bank that
focuses on inflation control. As a result, the compli-
cated explanations provided by the Bundesbank
when it missed its monetary target ranges were
accepted by the public and did not weaken the
support for the Bundesbank’s monetary policy
strategy. This is much less likely to work with the
wider European population.
Some evidence for this view is that the European
Central Bank (ECB) (or, more accurately, the European
System of Central Banks) has received a tremendous
amount of flack since its inception, although its
policies seem to be reasonable and inflation has
remained under control. I believe this has occurred
because the ECB suffers from a “communications
gap” and not a “policy executions gap.” Part of the
problem stems from the two-pillar strategy, which
I believe is confusing to the European public and
hinders effective communication. Given the instabil-
ity of the money-income relationship, the monetary
reference value requires complicated explanations
that are not fully understood by the European public.
It would be much clearer for the ECB to focus its
explanations of the conduct of monetary policy on
the second pillar, which addresses whether it is
meeting its inflation goal. In other words, one pillar
is better than two. I thus believe that the ECB would
reduce its communications gap if it adopted a flexi-
ble inflation-targeting framework akin to that fol-
lowed by inflation targeters, just as Switzerland has
done recently. It is important to note that dropping
the monetary-reference-value pillar does not rule
out a role for monetary aggregates in the formula-
tion of policy. Many inflation targeters, including
the Bank of England, do follow monetary aggregates
quite closely in thinking about the future path of
inflation, and this could certainly be an element in
an inflation-targeting framework for the ECB.
The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions
under Alan Greenspan have probably also been quite
consistent with what would have been done under
an inflation-targeting regime. Furthermore, as I have
pointed out elsewhere (Mishkin, 2000), the United
States has a nominal anchor that has been very
effective in recent years—it is Alan Greenspan. Thus
it is not at all clear that adoption of inflation targeting
in the United States would have improved recent
monetary policy performance. However, there is
still a strong argument for adoption of inflation
targeting by the United States. No matter how good
a nominal anchor Alan Greenspan is, he won’t be
around forever. It is better to depend less on indi-
viduals and more on institutions to achieve good
policy results. Thus we need to take steps now that
will institutionalize the desirable features of the
Greenspan Fed with its focus on price stability and
the use of preemptive strikes against either inflation-
ary or deflationary impulses in the economy. This
is exactly what inflation targeting is intended to
achieve.
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